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Although technological complexity seems to be a crucial determinant of economic development, it remains 
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derive complexity measures that position countries in this space. Our measures of technological diversification 
and the ubiquity of technologies present in a country’s technology portfolio are further used as an input to 
explain the role of technological complexity in countries’ income and economic development. We show that a 
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1. Introduction 
Intuitively, technological complexity is a crucial factor and a determinant of 
development. However, it still remains only implicitly present in the attempts to 
explain economic growth and technological progress. Despite obvious differences 
in technological development of countries and their potential consequences for 
economic development, technology is treated in a very general way or its richness 
is brutally reduced. The main reason behind this is the difficulty of capturing 
technological complexity in theoretical models and measuring it in empirical 
studies. 
In this work, we provide a methodology of constructing a global technology space 
and deriving complexity measures that position countries in this space. Our 
measures of technological diversification and the ubiquity of technologies present 
in a country’s technology portfolio are further used as an input to explain the role 
of technological complexity in countries’ income and economic development. 
Our work is motivated by recent findings concerning the production structure and 
its role in economic development (Hausmann & Hidalgo, 2010). The logic behind 
the economic complexity as a driving force of economic development is 
straightforward: Countries making more products which are less ubiquitous are 
more likely to achieve higher income and growth. Expecting that the same is true 
for technological capabilities, which are a missing link in the analysis of 
economic complexity framework by Hausmann and Hidalgo (2010), we extend 
this framework by creating a global technology space and, after ranking countries 
based on the level of their technological complexity, the main questions we aim to 
answer in this analysis include: What is the relationship between the level of a 
country's technological diversification and the ubiquity of technologies present in 
its technology space? How economic development is affected by the complexity 
of a country’s technology space? What is the link between the technological 
complexity and the level of growth? 
The main contribution of this work is that, by applying the network view of 
countries linked to the technologies they develop, we create a global technology 
space, which replicates the system of technological capabilities. Relying on micro 
information stored in individual patent applications, we are able to represent the 
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richness of the technological structure at the global level without reducing the 
level of detail. Consequently, our results show that a country's technological 
diversification and the ubiquity of technologies present in its technology space 
have positive and negative impact on income and growth respectively. 
In order to build the technology space and the subsequent measures of 
technological complexity, we use information included in patent applications. In 
particular, we rely on technological fields to which an invention corresponds. This 
information is coded through the International Patent Classification (IPC) classes. 
The source of our data is the European Patent Office (EPO) Worldwide Patent 
Statistical (PATSTAT) Database and the time considered spans from year 1991 to 
2009. The elaboration of indicators used in the proceeding analysis relies on 
altogether over 11 Million priority patent applications that were filed to any patent 
office worldwide. The number of individual IPC codes considered was of nearly 
30 Million. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 positions the current 
work among the existing literature on the issue of technological progress, 
complexity and economic development. Section 3 introduces the methodological 
framework behind the design of the technology space and the technological 
complexity measures. Section 4 presents the data used. Section 5 presents the 
results of empirical analysis. Section 6 includes robustness checks of the results 
against alternative measures of technological complexity. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
Our paper builds on the following strands of literature: first, it relates to the large 
body of research devoted to the determinants of economic growth. In particular, it 
seeks to create a link to the attempts of capturing the concept of technology and 
technological change into the empirical models of economic growth. Second, by 
introducing the new measures of technological development, it extends the 
research on the technological complexity and its economic consequences. Finally, 
by implementing the tool of network analysis it creates a connection with the 
relatively recent attempts to introduce this perspective to study economic 
phenomena. Below we provide a short overview of the above mentioned strands 
of literature and explain the linkages with the current work. 
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Despite a longstanding interest in the determinants of economic development and 
growth, causal inference drawn from the empirical evidence remains questionable 
and the magnitude and robustness of estimates for a wide range of factors are still 
under debate. Initially, empirical research on the sources of economic growth 
followed two theoretical classes of models (Capolupo, 2009). The first class 
considers capital accumulation as the driving force behind economic growth. 
Here, for example, the role of capital accumulation (Barro, 1991; Barro & Lee, 
2001; Cohen & Soto, 2007; Erosa, Koreshkova, & Restuccia, 2010; Murphy, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991; Oded & Omer, 2004; Sasaki, 2011) and the pattern of 
its use (Fitzgerald & Hallak, 2004) have drawn considerable attention. However, 
despite the theoretical role assigned to capital accumulation, the empirical results 
are highly unsatisfactory (Capolupo, 2009). After the criticism of the idea that 
production factors accumulation lies behind economic development (Islam, 1995, 
2003; Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare, 2005; Prescott, 1998), alternative explanations 
have emerged. These new approaches seek explanations behind economic 
inequalities in, for example, differences in political system (Azam, Bates, & Biais, 
2009; Besley, Persson, & Sturm, 2010; Castro, Clementi, & Macdonald, 2009; 
Cooper, 1972; Persson & Tabellini, 2006), the role of institutions (Andrianova, 
Demetriades, & Shortland, 2009; Branstetter, Fisman, Foley, & Saggi, 2011; 
Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008) or finally in the technological change (Aghion 
& Howitt, 1997; Eaton & Kortum, 1996; Niosi, 2008; Romer, 1990). 
Having a strong theoretical support, this argument has spurred a large stream of 
empirical research (Jorgenson, 1996). One of the obvious ways of looking at the 
relationship between technological change and growth is through the level of 
R&D investment. In a very extensive way, Griliches (1973, 1979, 1995) showed 
how investments in new technology can be translated into economic growth. This 
work is based on the proposition that aggregate input of intellectual capital, 
together with the inputs of individual producers serve as a determinant of output. 
In a stylized form, R&D intensity increases the rate of innovation (commonly 
proxied by the number of patents) and finally increased productivity at a firm 
level (Crepon, Duguet, & Mairessec, 1998) and, finally, economic growth at a 
country level (Zachariadis, 2003). 
The explanations of the relationship between technological progress and 
economic development go beyond the argument of R&D or patenting intensity 
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and range from explanations concerning the variance in infrastructure to 
entrepreneurial skills (Lloyd-Ellis & Bernhardt, 2000; Röller & Waverman, 
2001). However, a number of studies explaining the differences in the level of 
economic development between countries make a strong assumption of identical 
technologies for all the countries (Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992; Romer, 1987), 
although substantial differences in overall levels of productivity among countries 
have been documented (Christensen, Cummings, & Jorgenson, 1981; Denison, 
1967; Dougherty & Jorgenson, 1996). According to Islam (1995, 2003), 
technology levels across countries differ enormously across countries and the 
highest value is about forty times larger than the lowest. Also the stock of 
varieties (Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare, 2005) and the different composition of 
GDP across countries and across sectors (Caselli, 2005) are responsible for the 
differences in income and economic growth. Moreover, the differences in 
specialization patterns are economically meaningful as well (Groizard, 2009; 
Hausmann, Hwang, & Rodrik, 2007; Saviotti & Frenken, 2008). By developing an 
index that measures the "quality" of countries' export baskets, Hausmann et al. 
(2007) shows that countries with more sophisticated set of goods that perform 
better. Thus, technological differences among countries must be taken into 
account in econometric modeling of differences in economic development. 
Consequently, the issue of technological complexity in economic development is 
increasingly attracting more attention, although the concept is neither easy to 
capture in theoretical models (Blauwhof & Leydesdorff, 1993; Growiec & 
Schumacher, 2007; Pintea & Thompson, 2007; Pollak, 2010) nor to measure 
(Griliches, 1995).  
One of the first attempts to create a technological complexity, or rather a 
technological proximity measure, was by  Jaffe (1986) who, by exploiting firm-
level data on patenting in different technology classes, located firms in a multi-
dimensional technology space. Jaffe's (1986) approach to define the level of 
technological diversification has found a wide application. For example, Bloom et 
al. (2005) empirically distinguish a firm’s position in technology space and 
product market space using information on the distribution of its patenting across 
technology fields. In a similar way, Cincera (2005) uses an improved Jaffe's index 
to measure R&D spillovers among between firms and their effect on productivity. 
However, although widely adopted, and it is not clear to what extent the 
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uncentered correlation index between the firms’ technological vectors is a correct 
measure of technological proximity or complexity (Griliches, 1995). Hence, the 
concept of technological complexity remains hard to define empirically and this 
issue can be solved by experimenting alternative approaches. 
A novel approach to deal with economic complexity has been recently proposed 
by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009). By interpreting trade data as a bipartite 
network in which countries are connected to the products they export, they 
quantify the complexity of a country’s economy by characterizing the structure of 
this network. The key measures of complexity include countries diversification 
and the ubiquity of products they produce and export. The most important finding 
of this work is that economic complexity measures are correlated with a country’s 
level of income, and that deviations from this relationship are predictive of future 
growth (Hausmann & Hidalgo, 2010; Hidalgo, Klinger, Barabási, & Hausmann, 
2007). Arriving to these results was possible due to the application of network 
analysis, which besides biology and physics, slowly makes its road in the field of 
economics and has been applied to a wide range of topics ranging from 
international trade (De Benedictis & Tajoli, 2011; Garlaschelli & Loffredo, 2005) 
through internationalisation of inventive activity (De Prato & Nepelski, 2012, 
2014) to corporate ownership (Vitali, Glattfelder, & Battiston, 2011). 
This success of network analysis in studying economic phenomena comes from 
the fact that its tools are well suited to study complex systems, which are 
understood as being composed of many agents with numerous interactions. One of 
the key characteristics of such systems is that the entire system often shows 
characteristics that cannot be captured and described at the individual level. This 
concerns mainly the emergence, i.e. where macro behaviour emerges from the 
interactions of the agents at the micro level. Hence, this approach represents a 
good instrument to analyse the connection between the micro, or sectoral, level 
and the aggregate level, as it builds on a very small level of detail and, without 
reducing it, captures the complexity of reality. This, in turn, allows to make a 
number of observations and to draw conclusions which could not be reached 
without looking at the whole system rather than at individual relationships and 
interactions. These advantages of network analysis also motivate the use of a 
network perspective and derived measures to study technological complexity and 
its relationship with economic development. 
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3. Methodological framework 
Despite their limitations, patent data are the most accurate source of information 
on technological and inventive activities, which allows to make relatively accurate 
cross-country comparisons with respect to technological development (Griliches, 
1990). Thus, we make use of information included in patent applications to 
construct the technology space and, then, to locate countries in this space. In 
particular, we rely on technological fields to which an invention corresponds to. 
This information is coded through IPC classes. Below, we explain the 
methodological framework that we apply and discuss the process of extracting the 
information included in the patent documents to be used in the process of building 
the technology space and constructing measures of technological complexity. 
Technology space 
Similarly to the product space developed by Hidalgo et al. (2007) and further 
exploited by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2011; 2009), in order to construct the 
technology space, we apply the concept of bipartite networks. A bipartite network 
consists of a graph whose elements include three sets: two sets of nodes and a set 
of lines representing relations between nodes. In a formal way, bipartite network 
N is defined as 
 ),,( LVVN c τ=  (1) 
where ),...,,( 21 cCccc vvvV =  and ),...,,( 21 Τ= ττττ vvvV  are two partite sets of nodes of 
size C  and Τ  respectively. L  is the set of lines connecting the nodes in two sets 
(Gross & Yellen, 2004).  
In our framework, set one, cV , consists of countries and set one, τV , includes 664 
IPC technological classes. Formally, this network is represented by the adjacency 
matrix τcL , where 1=τcL , if country c is a producer of technology τ and 0 
otherwise. 
Measures of technological complexity 
Taking the technology space as a starting point, in order to construct measures of 
technological complexity, we apply the method of reflections, introduced and 
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described by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2011; 2009). This method describes the 
nodes of the two sets, countries and technologies, by a series of variables. In order 
to generate these variables, we follow an iterative process in which to define one 
type node, for example countries, information on the other type of nodes, i.e. 
technologies, is used. 
In a formal way, the method of reflections is defined as the following set of 
observable variables: 
 ∑ −=
τ
ττ 1,
0,
,
1
Nc
c
Nc kLk
k , (2) 
∑ −=
c
NccN kLk
k 1,
0,
,
1
τ
τ
τ
, (3) 
for 1≥N . The initial conditions are given by the degree, i.e. number of links, of 
countries and technologies:  
 ∑=
τ
τcc Lk 0, , (4) 
∑=
c
cLk ττ 0, . (5) 
By iterating this process, each country can be described by the vector 
),...,,(
,1,0, Ncccc kkkk =
ρ
and each technology by the vector ),...,,(
,1,0, Nkkkk ττττ =
ρ
. 
In economic terms, the degree of country c, 0,ck , and the degree of technology 
τ , 0,τk , represent the level of a country's diversification and the ubiquity of a 
technology respectively. Following this line of reasoning, considering countries, 
even variables, ...,, 4,2,0, ccc kkk , reflect their diversification level and odd 
variables, ...,, 5,3,1, ccc kkk , reflect the ubiquity of technologies in which countries 
specialize. The reverse is true for technologies, i.e. even variables characterize the 
ubiquity of technologies and odd variables the diversification of countries that 
produce these technologies.  
In the subsequent analysis, in order to locate countries in the technology space, we 
use 0ck , i.e. technological diversification of country c expressed by the total 
number of technological classes in which a country is active, and 1,ck , i.e. the 
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ubiquity of technologies developed by country c expressed by the number of 
countries that are also producers of the same technologies. 
4. Data 
To compute patent-based indicators used in the current study, we use raw patent 
data provided by the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database, commonly 
referred to as the PATSTAT database. This database provides a worldwide 
coverage of patent applications submitted to around 180 Patent Offices in the 
world. The present analysis is based on indicators built by extracting and 
elaborating patent application data from the April 2012 release of the PATSTAT 
database, taking into account patent applications filed to all Patent Offices 
included in PATSTAT.  
The time period taken into account covers from January 1st, 1991 to December 
31st, 2009. The reason for selecting this period of time is that of institutional 
transformations that took place, for example, in the Soviet Union and Central 
Europe, and caused changes to the global patent system. In particular, as we 
allocate patent to countries based on the inventor's country of residence and not to 
the country to whose patent office an application was filled, the possibility of 
collecting reliable patent information and reconstructing the inventive 
performance of some countries would have been challenged. 
We use WIPO IPC 2006.01 classification version to extract information on the 
technology classes coded in patent applications, which includes 664 individual 
technological classes.1 Our checks took into account IPC codes belonging to 
alternative IPC classification schemes. These checks confirmed that another 
classification scheme does not affect the results. 
The elaboration of indicators used in the proceeding analysis relies on altogether 
over 11 Million priority patent applications that were filed to any patent office 
worldwide between January 1st, 1991 to December 31st, 2009 (Table 1). The 
number of individual IPC codes, which we consider in constructing the 
technology space and the subsequent measures of technological complexity was 
nearly 30 Million. 
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Obtaining the information on technology classes and assigning it to a country is 
far from being straightforward. Thus, raw data coming from PATSTAT are 
elaborated through a series of methodological steps, starting with those 
consolidated in literature (de Rassenfosse, Dernis, Guellec, Picci, & van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2013; Picci, 2010; Turlea et al., 2011) to deal with 
some remaining criticalities, mainly related to the process of exchange of 
information among patent offices, which affects patent data. First, as the needed 
variables are intended to provide measure of the inventive capability of countries, 
rather than of the productivity of patent offices, the subset of 'priority patent 
applications' is initially taken into account, to avoid double counting and the 
limitation coming from considering granted patents (OECD, 2008, 2009). The 
year is assigned along with the information coming with the filing date given 
when the application was first filed at a patent office by an applicant seeking 
patent. Second, to the extent of the present analysis the issue of missing 
information is in fact still relevant, when it comes to identify the country of 
residence of applicants (or inventors), and several methodological steps are 
followed in order to collect missing country information from other records 
related to the patent application, and to proxy it with that of the country where the 
application has been filed only as a last resort. A detailed description of the 
methodology can be found in de Rassenfosse, Dernis, Guellec, et al.  (2011). 
Further difficulties arise from the fact that first, there is usually more than one IPC 
class assigned to an invention and, second, it is relatively common that the list of 
inventors and/or applicants frequently includes individuals or entities residing in 
different countries (De Prato & Nepelski, 2014). In order to overcome these 
obstacles, we treat patent data by taking into account all levels of the IPC 
classification. If a patent is assigned to more than one IPC code, not only the main 
(first) IPC code is taken into account but all of them. The application is divided 
equally among all IPC codes, i.e. fractional counting, avoiding thus double 
counting. Only after the fractional counting the IPC codes are rounded at the class 
level the resulting sum is then assigned to a country. Regarding the assigning 
patents to countries, there are two common methodologies: it is possible to refer 
to either the declared country of residence of the inventor(s) (‘inventor criterion’) 
                                                                                                                                     
1
 More information can be found under: 
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/ITsupport/versions.html 
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of a patent, or to that of the applicant(s) (‘applicant criterion’) (OECD, 2008). 
Several applicants could hold rights on a patent application, and they would have 
legal title to the patent once (and if) it is granted. In the same way, several 
inventors could have taken part in the development process of the invention, and 
be listed in the patent application. A fractional count is applied in order to assign 
patents to countries in cases where several inventors (or applicants) with different 
countries of residence have to be considered for the same application. In general, 
the choice of the criterion depends on the perspective from which innovative 
capability is being investigated. In this study, the adoption of the inventor 
criterion has been chosen, as it allows to represent a country technological 
capabilities more accurately (de Rassenfosse et al., 2011; Turlea et al., 2011). 
Data on GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita originates from the 
International Monetary Found (IMF, 2012). In this analysis, we use GDP data for 
the period between 1991 and 2009. 
5. Empirical analysis 
Technological complexity 
We start our analysis of technological complexity by looking at the relationship 
between a country's diversification ( 0ck ) and the ubiquity of technologies, which 
it develops ( 1ck ). Figure 1 represents this relationship for two time periods, i.e. 
1991 and 2009. Despite a considerable number of countries that have a very low 
level of diversification, we can observe a relatively strong negative relationship 
between the two measures of complexity, which is also confirmed by a 
significantly negative correlation (see Table 3). More interestingly, this negative 
relationship has increased over time, indicating that the technological level of 
countries diverged (see Figure 4). In other words, whereas some countries 
continued to increase their technological competencies and hence complexity, 
others stagnated. 
In practical terms, the most technologically diversified country was Japan, whose 
technology space counted 610 out of total 664 technological classes in 2005. In 
comparison, the technology space of Estonia counted only 31 classes. At the same 
time, however, technologies included in the Japanese technology space were 
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present in technology spaces of, on average, 26 other countries, whereas Estonia 
had over 40 potential competitors in each technological field it was active in. 
Thus, following the relationship between countries technological diversification 
and the ubiquity of their technologies identified above, with respect to the 
characteristics of technology space, we expect that less ubiquitous technologies 
are more complex at the same time. As a result, they will be present in the 
technology space of fewer countries. Consequently, as in the case of economic 
complexity analyzed by Hausmann and Hidalgo (2011), technologically 
diversified countries tend to also be active in less ubiquities fields of technology. 
In an analogical way, we also expect that these characteristics of the technology 
space and complexity of technologies will have an impact on the economic 
development of countries. We tackle this question in the subsequent sections. 
Figure 1: Relationship between countries' diversification and ubiquity of their technologies, 
1991 & 2009 
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Country values of technological diversification of countries, 0,ck , and their average level of technology ubiquity 1,ck  in 
years 1991 and 2009. N = 137. Technology and country of invention origin assigned by fractional counting according to the 
inventor criterion. Source: Own calculations based on EPO PATSTAT Database, 2012. 
 
Technological complexity and economic development 
What is the relationship between technological complexity of a country and its 
economic development? Again, to get some insight into this question, we first 
look at the visual representation of the link between a country level of income and 
its technological diversification (Figure 2 a&b) and the ubiquity of technologies it 
develops (Figure 2 c&d) in year 1991 and 2009. Both measures of technological 
complexity behave in the expected way. Whereas the level of income is positively 
correlated with the number of technologies in a country's technology space, the 
average ubiquity of technologies it develops has a negative impact on GDP. 
Although we can observe some deviations, which might be related to the size of a 
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country and its patenting performance, e.g. Luxemburg or Singapore, the general 
trend remains rather steady over time (see Figure 5). 
In order to empirically address the relationship between technological complexity 
of a country and its economic development, we are interested in estimating the 
following equation: 
tctctctc KY ,,, νηα +′++= . (6) 
The dependent variable is tcY , stands for income per capita in country c at period t. 
Country-fixed effects,
cα , and time-fixed effects, tη , capture time-invariant 
country characteristics and global trends respectively. The main variable of 
interest is represented by the vector tcK ,′ , which includes country specific level of 
technological complexity, i.e. its technological diversification ( 0,ck ) and the 
ubiquity of technologies which it develops ( 1,ck ). Other country and time-varying 
factors are included in the error term tc,ν . 
Figure 2: Relationship between countries' diversification and GDP and between ubiquity of 
their technologies and GDP, 1991 & 2009 
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Relationship between technological diversification of countries, 0,ck , and income (a, b) and average level of ubiquity of 
their technologies 1,ck  and income (c, d) in years 1991 (N = 96) and 2009 (N = 119). Technology and country of invention 
origin assigned by fractional counting according to the inventor criterion. Source: Own calculations based on EPO 
PATSTAT Database, 2012. 
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The results of the estimations of the static model defined in (6) are reported in 
Table 4. According to the pooled cross-sectional OLS estimates shown in column 
(1), the positive relationship between the level of income and a country's 
diversification ( 0ck ) is confirmed. Moreover, considering the value of 2R , the 
overall explanatory strength of this variable is relatively strong. Similarly, we find 
confirmation of the negative impact of the potential number of countries 
competing in the same technological fields, measured by the average ubiquity of 
technologies developed by a country ( 1ck ), and the level of economic 
development (column (2)). The results of these two basic regressions remain 
unchanged once we control for the technological diversification and the ubiquity 
of technologies in one estimation (column (3)). Moreover, to a large extent, these 
results are nor affected if we control for country effects and for (columns (4)-(6)) 
and time effects (columns (7)-(9)). The only exception concerns the average 
ubiquity of technologies developed by a country ( 1ck ). Once we isolate the within 
effect of technology ubiquity by adding country dummies, the coefficient changes 
its sign from negative to positive. This does not happen when time effects are 
considered. A potential explanation of this behavior is the relatively strong 
explanatory power of country-dependent characteristics with respect to country 
income. This is confirmed by a high value of 2R , which approaches 1, in each 
estimation including country-effects. In comparison, factors included in the 
estimation controlling only for a country's technological complexity account for 
nearly 25% of cross-country variation in income. 
Technological complexity and economic growth 
Turning to the next question of our analysis, we want to investigate the 
relationship between technological complexity and income growth. Figure 2 
visualizes the link between technological diversification (a&b) and the ubiquity of 
technologies a country develops (c&d) and the level of income growth in year 
1991 and 2009. Although the relationship between these two measures of 
complexity is less pronounced as in the case of income, we can see that there are 
some clear trends that can be read out of the presented data. In particular, 
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technological diversification seems to positively affect the level of economic 
growth, the level of technology ubiquity has the opposite effect.  
According the results of pair-wise correlation (see Table 3), whereas the 
correlation between the former one and income growth is strongly positive (0.37 
at 99% significance level) the latter one is negatively correlated with economic 
progress level of technological (-0.23 at 99% significance level). When we look at 
the evolution of this relationship, we can see that, with some fluctuations, the 
correlation between the two measures of technological complexity on income 
growth has remained qualitatively stable. 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between countries' diversification and income growth and between 
ubiquity of their technologies and income growth, 1992 & 2008 
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Relationship between technological diversification of countries, 0,ck , (a, b) and average level of ubiquity of their 
technologies 1,ck  and annual income growth  (c, d) in years 1992 (N = 72) and 2008 (N = 119). Technology and country of 
invention origin assigned by fractional counting according to the inventor criterion. Source: Own calculations based on 
EPO PATSTAT Database, 2012. 
 
In order to estimate the relationship between technological complexity and 
income growth, we are interested in the following equation: 
tctctctctctc KYYG ,,1,,, lnln νηα +′++=−≡ − . (7) 
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In this case, the dependent variable is tcG , , which represents the logarithmic 
annual growth of income per capita in country c at period t. As previously, we 
control for country- (
cα ) and time-fixed effects ( tη ) and the main variable of 
interest is represented by the vector tcK ,′ , which includes country specific level of 
technological complexity. Error term is represented by tc,ν . 
The results of the estimation of the above model are reported in Table 5. As in the 
previous case, we begin with a pooled cross-sectional OLS regression (columns 
(1)-(3)). Regressions in which we control only for the individual effect of the 
technological complexity measures confirm our expectations concerning their 
impact on growth of GDP. Whereas we find a positive relationship between the 
income growth and a country's diversification ( 0ck ), reported in column (1), we 
obtain the opposite result concerning the level of technology ubiquity. In a joint 
regression (column (3)), only 0ck coefficient remains statistically significant. In 
contrast to the estimation of technological complexity and income, the 
explanatory power of the two variables of income growth is considerably weaker, 
i.e. the value of 2R  is 0,14 versus 0,25 in the income regression. 
These results do not alter significantly when we control for country-effects 
(columns (4)-(6)) or time effects (columns (4)-(6)). Moreover, in the latter case, 
the value of the coefficient corresponding to the impact of the average ubiquity of 
technologies developed by a country ( 1ck ) on its income growth comes back to its 
"expected", i.e. negative, sign and remains significant at the 99% level. 
6. Robustness check 
A robustness check of the results presented in the previous section would require, 
for example, an alternative data source. However, as already mentioned 
(Griliches, 1995), a comparable source of information on countries' technological 
activity and performance to patent statistics does not exist yet. Thus, in order to 
test the robustness of our results, we compute alternative measures of 
technological complexity to the ones derived through network analysis and the 
methods of reflections. 
One of the most popular measure of diversification is the Herfindahl–Hirschman 
index, which commonly applied in antitrust and also in technology management 
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studies (Liston-Heyes & Pilkington, 2004), is a measure of concentration. In a 
formal way, the Herfindahl–Hirschman index can be defined as: 
∑
=
=
N
tctc sHH
1
2
,,,
)(
τ
τ
, (8) 
where tcs ,,τ is the share of technologyτ in the technological pool of country c at 
time t. The straightforward interpretation of the index is that its value is 0 if a 
country has only one technology and becomes close to 1 if a country’s technology 
space is composed of equally divided technological groups. 
Another count method for measuring diversification is the entropy index. The 
entropy measure of diversification weights each tcs ,,τ  by the logarithm of 
tcs ,,
1
τ
 
and can be expressed as follows: 
∑
=
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N
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τ τ
τ
. (9) 
As in the previous case, if a firm is exclusively present in one technological class, 
its entropy is zero and its value increases with the number of distinct 
technological classes. In contrast, the Herfindahl–Hirschman, the entropy measure 
is designed to decompose the total diversification measure into meaningful 
elements of total diversification (van Kranenburg, Hagedoorn, & Pennings, 2004). 
Thus, the advantage of the entropy measure is that it relied on the contribution of 
diversification at each level of classified group aggregation to the total. 
The above specified measures of diversification extend vector tcK ,′ , which 
includes country specific level of technological complexity. Additional 
estimations of the impact of technological complexity on economic development 
and growth, which include the additional variables, are reported in Table 6 and 
Table 7 respectively. 
According to Table 6, the H-H index of technological diversification has a 
negative (column (1)) and the measure of entropy (column (2)) a positive impact 
on the level of economic growth. Coefficients of the two alternative measures of 
diversification of a country technology space are significant at the 99% level. 
However, when considering the value of 2R , the entropy index performs better, as 
compared to the H-H index in explaining the cross-country variations in income. 
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In the H-H index estimation, the adjusted- 2R equals 0.21, as compared to 0.31 in 
the entropy index. Moreover, the entropy index seems to perform better than our 
primary measures of technological complexity, i.e. the level of technological 
diversification ( 0ck ) and the average ubiquity of technologies developed by a 
country ( 1ck ). Whereas 0ck and 1ck  taken together account for nearly 25% 
variation in income, the entropy index is more effective by around 6%. This is 
confirmed when we consider all measures of technological complexity together 
(Table 6, column (3)). However, this advantage is weakened when we consider 
country- and time-effects. 
According to Table 7, out of the two alternative measures of technological 
complexity, entropy index performs better than the H-H index in explaining the 
differences in income growth. Moreover, the regression with entropy index has a 
higher value of adjusted- 2R , as compared with the regression including the level 
of technological diversification ( 0ck ) and the average ubiquity of technologies 
developed by a country ( 1ck ) (see Table 5, column (3)). Thus, it is quite clear that 
the entropy index together with the complexity measures derived through the 
method of reflection are "competing" among each other as the best predictor of 
income growth. However, the final decision is rather complicated, considering the 
behavior of the variables when additional effects are taken into account. Whereas 
the inclusion of country dummies cancels out the importance of the H-H and 
entropy indices, time effects have the opposite effect on the level of technological 
diversification ( 0ck ) and the average ubiquity of technologies developed by a 
country ( 1ck ).  
The possible explanation behind this behavior is that both H-H and entropy 
indices are rather designed to consider the shares of a technology class in the total 
technology portfolio, and hence better capture the absolute changes in the 
technological activity, proxied by the number of patents. The significance of the 
measures of complexity derived through the method of reflections are, on the 
other hand, more sensitive to the total number of patents. This is particularly the 
case when we deal with two groups of countries where one group has very low 
and the other very high measures of complexity. This is illustrated at the 
beginning of this analysis, where it was shown that there is a relatively large 
group of countries that score very low on both measures (Figure 1). Moreover, as 
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both types of technological complexity put emphasize on different aspects, i.e. 
entropy index performs a self-analysis, whereas the measures of diversification 
and technology ubiquity compare a country against all the other countries, we 
need to recognize their differences and the value they deliver. Thus, a final 
conclusion with respect to the question of which measure of technological 
complexity is more accurate to study the level of income and its growth is rather 
difficult, as the check against other measure does not disqualify the primary 
measures used in this study.  
7. Conclusions 
To better understand the characteristics of the technology space and the role of 
technological complexity in economic development, we apply the network 
perspective that links countries to technologies they develop and rank them 
according to the level of their diversification and the ubiquity of technologies they 
develop. We show that there is negative relationship between the two measures of 
technological complexity and that they significantly impact a country's economic 
development and growth. 
Despite delivering some novel insights, our work suffers from some limitations. 
First of all, patent data, despite its richness of information, suffers from its own 
obvious drawbacks. Most importantly, for technical reasons, we ignore the value 
of patents, and do not take into account neither a country’s IPR environment, 
which also strongly affect the possibility of observing and mapping the 
technology space of a country. Second, one limitation of the applied methodology 
and measures of technological complexity is that they do not account for the size 
of technological activity. Our checks confirmed, for example, that by putting only 
a small threshold either on the total number of patents produced by a country or 
the minimum number of patents in one technological field, the sample of 
countries is significantly reduced. Hence, due to the fact that mainly developed 
countries are active technology producers, we expect that controlling for the size 
of inventive and technological activity would not substantially change our results. 
Third, due to the fact that there is no theoretical foundation explaining the 
formation and evolution of technology space, we cannot provide any empirical 
insights into its development. We believe, however, that addressing this question 
in both the theoretical and empirical way is worthwhile. 
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In conclusion, our analysis provides a unique reflection on and a systematic view 
of a methodology to map a country's technology space and to assess its position 
with respect to the remaining countries. As a result, it serves as a basis for 
formulating some conclusions that could not be drawn without the application of 
the proposed methodology. We confirm that the level of technological complexity 
has a positive impact on the level of economic development and growth. The main 
channel through which it happens is the exclusiveness and uniqueness of the 
technological portfolio a country has, as compared to the remaining countries. In 
other words, the bargaining power and the rents extracted from the interactions 
with other countries will depend on a country's relative position against the 
remaining countries, i.e. the global technology space. Thus, while strengthening 
technological and scientific capabilities, countries need to take into account 
broader environment, where many are competing for scarce resources. 
8. Appendix: Tables and figures 
Table 1: Number of priority patent applications IPC classes processed 
Year 
Number of priority patent 
applications 
Number of IPC classes  
treated 
1991 470.674 1.290.836 
1992 439.322 1.222.801 
1993 452.866 1.261.776 
1994 445.286 1.250.856 
1995 469.993 1.330.653 
1996 487.695 1.370.996 
1997 510.413 1.424.622 
1998 534.983 1.483.549 
1999 552.158 1.562.000 
2000 593.825 1.815.541 
2001 622.670 1.887.685 
2002 605.715 1.766.195 
2003 627.445 1.832.714 
2004 632.849 1.745.016 
2005 663.111 1.656.958 
2006 674.221 1.718.230 
2007 699.879 1.768.180 
2008 733.374 1.804.734 
2009 692.950 1.712.195 
Total  10.909.429 29.905.537 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO PATSTAT Database, 2012 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
kc,0, – Diversification 2636 115,294 174,8 1,000 621,000 
kc,1 – Technology ubiquity 2636 39,944 9,595 8,000 89,000 
H-Hc, – Herfindal index 2636 0,261 0,322 0,003 1,000 
Entropy index 2636 2,673 1,846 0,000 5,689 
Ln GDP PPP per capita 2214 8,834 1,200 5,801 11,319 
Ln annual growth of GDP 1813 5,913 1,354 -1,965 9,829 
Source: Own calculations based on EPO PATSTAT Database, 2012 and IMF World Economic Outlook Database. 
 
Table 3: Pair-wise correlation between variables 
 
 
Figure 4: Correlation between countries' diversification and ubiquity of their technologies 
between 1991 and 2009 
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Evolution of the level of correlation between the average value of technological diversification of countries, 0,ck , and the 
average level of technology ubiquity 1,ck  between 1991 and 2009. Technology and country of invention origin assigned 
by fractional counting according to the inventor criterion. Source: Own calculations based on EPO PATSTAT Database, 
2012. 
 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 
1) kc,0t – Diversification 1.000      
2) kc,1t – Technology ubiquity -0.574* 1     
3) H-Hc, – Herfindal index -0.490* 0.361* 1    
4) Entropyc, 0.802* -0.538* -0.848* 1   
5) ln GDPc, PPP p. capita 0.499* -0.333* -0.455* 0.560* 1  
6) Gc, – log annual growth of 
GDP PPP p. capita 0.374* -0.230* -0.352* 0.443* 0.763* 1 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the data from EPO PATSTAT Database 2012 and IMF World Economic 
Outlook Database 2012 
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Figure 5: Correlation between GDP and countries' diversification and products' ubiquity 
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Evolution of the level of correlation between technological diversification of countries, 0,ck , and GDP and between 
average level of technology ubiquity 1,ck  and GDP between 1991 and 2009. Technology and country of invention origin 
assigned by fractional counting according to the inventor criterion. GDP at Purchasing Power Parity per capita expressed in 
natural logarithm. Source: Own calculations based on EPO PATSTAT Database, 2012 and IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database. 
 
Figure 6: Correlation between annual GDP growth and countries' diversification and 
products' ubiquity 
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Evolution of the level of correlation between technological diversification of countries, 0,ck , and annual growth of GDP 
and between average level of technology ubiquity 1,ck  and annual growth of GDP between 1991 and 2009. Technology 
and country of invention origin assigned by fractional counting according to the inventor criterion. GDP at Purchasing 
Power Parity per capita expressed in natural logarithm. Source: Own calculations based on EPO PATSTAT Database, 2012 
and IMF World Economic Outlook Database. 
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Table 4: The relationship between country's diversification, technology ubiquity and income between 1991 and 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable  OLS Country FE Time FE 
Yc,t – log GDP PPP p. capita  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
kc,0,t – Diversification 0,003***  0,003*** 0,001***  0,001*** 0,003***  0,003*** 
 (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000)  (0,000) 
kc,1,t – Technology ubiquity  -0,042*** -0,006**  0,009*** 0,010***  -0,050*** -0,015*** 
  (0,002) (0,002)  (0,000) (0,001)  (0,003) (0,003) 
Constant 8,403*** 1,049*** 8,664*** 7,060*** 5,569*** 5,571*** 7,973*** 10,349*** 8,628*** 
 (0,027) (0,103) (0,104) (0,027) (0,274) (0,104) (0,104) (0,148) (0,165) 
Adjusted R-squared 0,249 0,110 0,245 0,946 0,949 0,949 0,288 0,184 0,296 
Observations 2214 2214 2214 2214 2214 2214 2214 2214 2214 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of GDP at PPP per capita. Explanatory variable include country's diversification, i.e. kc,0,t , and the average 
ubiquity of technologies developed by a country at time t. Models from (1)-(3) report pooled cross-sectional OLS estimates in the maximum number of 
countries-years. Models from (4)-(6) include country dummies and models from (7)-(9) include year constants. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source:  Own calculations based on the data from EPO PATSTAT Database 2012 and IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2012. 
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Table 5: The relationship between country's diversification, technology ubiquity and annual income growth between 1991 and 2009 
 
 
 
Dependent variable  OLS Country FE Time FE 
Gc,t – log annual growth of 
GDP PPP p. capita  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
kc,0,t – Diversification 0,003***  0,003*** 0,003***  0,003*** 0,003***  0,002*** 
 (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000)  (0,001) (0,000)  (0,000) 
kc,1,t – Technology ubiquity  -0,032*** 0,001  0,018*** 0,019***  -0,043*** -0,013*** 
  (0,000) (0,004)  (0,003) (0,003)  (0,000) (0,004) 
Constant 5,535*** 7,188*** 5,483*** 6,719*** 6,425*** 6,384*** 5,310*** 7,353*** 5,841*** 
 (0,037) (0,131) (0,177) (0,865) (0,863) (0,858) (0,137) (0,182) (0,216) 
Adjusted R-squared 0,140 0,110 0,140 0,592 0,597 0,602 0,217 0,159 0,221 
Observations 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of annual growth of GDP at PPP per capita. Explanatory variable include country's diversification, i.e. kc,0,t , and 
the average ubiquity of technologies developed by a country at time t. Models from (1)-(3) report pooled cross-sectional OLS estimates in the maximum 
number of countries-years. Models from (4)-(6) include country dummies and models from (7)-(9) include year constants. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the data from EPO PATSTAT Database 2012 and IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2012. 
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Table 6: The relationship between country's technological diversification and annual income between 1991 and 2009 
Dependent variable  OLS Country FE Time FE 
Yc,t – log GDP PPP p. capita  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
H-Hc,t – Herfindal index -1,729***  -0,087 -0,125***  -0,337*** -1,704***  0,067 
 (0,072)  (0,157) (0,034)  (-0,061) (0,070)  (0,153) 
Entropyc,t  0,360*** 0,271***  0,025*** -0,102***  0,361*** 0,294*** 
 
 (0,011) (0,039)  (0,011) (0,021)  (0,011) (0,038) 
kc,0,t – Diversification   0,001***   0,002***   0,001*** 
   (0,000)   (0,000)   (0,000) 
kc,1,t – Technology ubiquity   0,001   0,009***   -0,007*** 
   (0,003)   (0,001)   (0,003) 
Constant 9,247*** 7,802*** 7,892*** 7,129*** 7,040*** 5,912*** 8,926*** 7,457*** 7,811*** 
 (0,028) (0,039) (0,185) (0,279) (0,279) (0,274) (0,109) (0,103) (0,205) 
Adjusted R-squared 0,207 0,313 0,245 0,946 0,946 0,950 0,237 0,352 0,361 
Observations 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of GDP at PPP per capita. Explanatory variable include Herfindahl–Hirschman index of concentration in 
technological classes, Entropy index controlling for diversification of technological basket and technological diversification, i.e. kc,0,t, and the average 
ubiquity of technologies developed by a country at time t. Models from (1)-(3) report pooled cross-sectional OLS estimates in the maximum number of 
countries-years. Models from (4)-(6) include country dummies and models from (7)-(9) include year constants. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the data from EPO PATSTAT Database 2012 and IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2012. 
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Table 7: The relationship between country's technological diversification and annual income between 1991 and 2009 
 
 
 
Dependent variable  OLS Country FE Time FE 
Gc,t – log annual growth of 
GDP PPP p. capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
H-Hc,t – Herfindal index -1.564***  0.412* -0.251**  -0.250 -1.529***  0.584*** 
 
(0.098)  (0.219) (0.120)  (0.228) (0.095)  (0.210) 
Entropyc,t  0.324*** 0.396***  0.102*** -0.032  0.327*** 0.412*** 
 
 (0.015) (0.054)  (0.038) (0.081)  (0.015) (0.051) 
kc,0,t – Diversification   0.000   0.003***   -0.000 
 
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000) 
kc,1,t – Technology ubiquity   0.010***   0.019***   -0.003 
 
  (0.004)   (0.003)   (0.004) 
Constant 6.263*** 4.959*** 4.219*** 7.869*** 7.672*** 6.639*** 6.043*** 4.677*** 4.435*** 
 
(0.037) (0.536) (0.255) (0.870) (0.867) (0.889) (0.138) (0.139) (0.278) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.123 0.196 0.200 0.589 0.590 0.602 0.191 0.272 0.275 
Observations 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 1813 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of annual growth of GDP at PPP per capita. Explanatory variable include Herfindahl–Hirschman index of 
concentration in technological classes, Entropy index controlling for diversification of technological basket and technological diversification, i.e. kc,0,t, and 
the average ubiquity of technologies developed by a country at time t. Models from (1)-(3) report pooled cross-sectional OLS estimates in the maximum 
number of countries-years. Models from (4)-(6) include country dummies and models from (7)-(9) include year constants. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source: Own calculations based on the data from EPO PATSTAT Database 2012 and IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2012. 
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